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ALMOST BUT NOT QUITE PERFECT:
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND POTENTIAL
FUTURE OF HORIZONTAL
MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Marleina Paz*
Since the beginning of his administration, President Obama and his
colleagues at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) have espoused a renewed vigor for
horizontal merger enforcement. While this more aggressive stance is
appropriate given that the U.S. economy is currently recovering from a
recession, the disparity between the government agencies’ and the
federal courts’ approaches to examining proposed horizontal mergers
poses an obstacle to successful legal analysis in this area. This Article
presents four solutions that would close the gap in horizontal merger
enforcement between the courts and the agencies—as well as between
the agencies themselves—and achieve the government’s antitrust goals
of fostering competition and promoting consumer welfare. These
solutions regarding the adoption of the new Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, consistency between the FTC and the DOJ, the serious
consideration of efficiency and efficiency-related arguments, and the
utilization of behavioral economics would improve the analysis of
potential business combinations. This is especially important in rapidly
developing industries that, because of their inherent characteristics,
pose unique challenges to determining when a horizontal merger will
harm the economy.
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thoughtful input, keen editing, and tremendous support. I would also like to thank the staffers and
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support, encouragement, and love. I could not have done this without you.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The law protects competition, not competitors.”1 This seemed
to be the theme driving the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and its
lawsuit
against
AT&T
and
T-Mobile,
two
wireless
telecommunications companies that announced a $39 billion merger
on March 20, 2011.2 Because the DOJ believed that competition
would be harmed by losing T-Mobile as an independent competitor
in the market—which would result in higher prices, reduced quality
of service, and fewer choices for consumers—it argued that the
merger should be permanently enjoined.3 While the merger may have
produced some benefits, the lawsuit demonstrated that the DOJ was
less concerned with the potential benefits of the transaction and more
focused on how consumers would be affected by the lack of
competition in the wireless telecommunications market.
In cases such as this, Section 7 of the Clayton Act—(“Section
7”)—which requires a merger’s challenger to show that it will create
a reasonable probability of a monopoly or a substantial lessening of
competition—governs.4 Because of Section 7, the government can
preemptively attack mergers that would be likely to harm
competition before consumers actually feel any anticompetitive
effects in the market.5 Thus, Section 7 provides the DOJ with a

1. Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped—A Story of the
Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331, 335 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane
eds., 2007) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
2. Complaint at 2–5, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,
2011) [hereinafter Complaint, United States v. AT&T]. In mid-December 2011, however, AT&T
abandoned its plans to merge with T-Mobile because of the government’s concerns with the
transaction. AT&T T-Mobile Deal Dropped after Fierce Government Backlash, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 19, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/19/att-tmobile-biddropped_n_1158851.html.
3. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 20–21.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). Since Section 7 applies “in any line of commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce . . . , the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” the statute and especially its Celler-Kefauver
amendments make clear that this law covers transactions such as horizontal mergers, vertical
mergers, conglomerate mergers, and market extensions. Id. However, this Article focuses
exclusively on horizontal mergers and the ways in which the federal government and the courts
have addressed this topic.
5. Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated Mergers
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 48 (2004).
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statutory basis to preemptively halt deals like the AT&T and TMobile merger if a federal court agrees that the transaction is
substantially anticompetitive in nature.
The case involving AT&T and T-Mobile is but one of the many
examples of the Obama Administration’s renewed vigor when it
comes to merger enforcement. Historically, enforcement of the
antitrust laws that regulate horizontal mergers has been inconsistent
due to the differing opinions of political leaders and judges.6 The
most recent example of this is the Obama Administration’s more
aggressive stance on mergers as compared to the Bush
Administration’s position on the subject.7 Unlike the Bush
Administration, which adopted a laissez-faire approach, the Obama
Administration has repeatedly made it clear that it will aggressively
monitor these transactions and “take effective action to stop or
restructure those mergers that are likely to harm consumer welfare,
while quickly clearing those that do not.”8 Given the distressed state
of the economy, the Obama Administration has argued that increased
enforcement will foster competition among companies, thereby
stimulating the economy and benefitting consumers.9
Despite these good intentions, various commentators have
questioned whether the Obama Administration is properly handling
the issue of horizontal merger enforcement.10 While the argument
that increased oversight in this economy is necessary to ensure
competition and promote consumer welfare is valid, some critics
have argued that the Obama Administration’s approach to merger
enforcement is effectively preventing beneficial business transactions
6. William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 134–36 (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/2009horizontalmerger.pdf.
7. See infra Part III.
8. Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust
Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential
%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf.
9. Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era: Remarks as Prepared for the Center for
American Progress, 5–16 (May 11, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/245711.pdf).
10. See Michael Mandel, Obama Should Restrain the Regulators, CNN (Aug. 17, 2011, 5:22
PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/17/obama-should-restrain-the-regulators/
?iref=allsearch; Peter Schiff, Obama Looking Like Job Killer in Chief, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2011,
6:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/09/02/obama-looking-like-jobkiller-in-chief/.
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from taking place.11 Furthermore, they assert that the government’s
decisions are actually hurting consumer welfare by destroying jobs.12
For these reasons, it is important to determine whether this more
restrictive approach is as beneficial as the Obama Administration
suggests that it is.
There is another pressing issue in horizontal merger
enforcement: whether the agencies13 in charge of merger review and
the courts are treating these transactions appropriately. While the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the DOJ have engaged in
federal litigation to challenge questionable horizontal mergers,14
many of these issues are addressed outside of court at the agency
level.15 For this reason, the FTC and the DOJ have created
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to help businesses understand what the
agencies can consider when investigating these transactions.16
However, these guidelines, which the FTC and the DOJ updated in
October 2010, are not binding legal authority.17 Therefore, while
courts have adopted some suggestions from previous versions of the
guidelines,18 it is unclear whether they will readily accept the
proposals from the new 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.19 This
will likely put companies in a difficult position as they plan and
propose mergers, especially if they anticipate resistance and potential
litigation.
This problem of uncertainty is compounded for companies in
rapidly changing industries, such as telecommunications and
technology.20 Regarding market definition—a factor that courts have

11. Mandel, supra note 10; Schiff, supra note 10.
12. Mandel, supra note 10; Schiff, supra note 10.
13. This Article refers to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the DOJ collectively as
the “federal agencies” or the “agencies.”
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a, 18a(b)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring parties to a merger to
obtain agency approval before consummating the transaction).
16. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
hmg-2010.pdf.
17. Leah Brannon & Kathleen Bradish, The Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Can the
Courts Be Persuaded?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2010, at 1.
18. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
19. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17.
20. See infra Part V.
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emphasized as a starting point for establishing a Section 7 claim21—
the new merger guidelines state that the FTC and the DOJ will
usually, but not always, start by defining a relevant market 22 when
challenging a proposed merger.23 Given this inconsistency between
the courts and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines with respect to
market definition, companies in technology-based industries may not
know what to follow as they structure their transactions.24
Additionally, efficiency and innovation issues25 that inhere in the
telecommunications and technology industries, if given enough time
for research and development, may easily outweigh identifiable
market concerns.26 Unfortunately, courts do not always focus on
efficiency and innovation arguments,27 which puts certain companies
at a disadvantage when attempting to successfully complete a
merger.
Given the current state of merger enforcement, this Article
argues that while the Obama Administration’s aggressive stance on
horizontal merger enforcement is necessary to foster competition and
prevent harm to consumers in today’s economic climate, the real
obstacle that companies and consumers face is the disconnect
between the courts’ and the agencies’ approaches to proposed
mergers. If courts do not attempt to adopt some of the new
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, companies may not have the guidance
they need to structure successful mergers that will benefit
21. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (describing
the “[d]etermination of the relevant market” as “a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation”
of Section 7); see also Brown Shoe, Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (indicating
that Section 7 requires the determination of market definition).
22. Defining a relevant market requires the parties proposing or challenging a horizontal
merger to specify the industry and geographic location that the merger will affect. 2010
GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 7–15.
23. Id.
24. See infra Part III.B.1.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See Sunny Woan, Note, Antitrust in Wonderland: Regulating Markets of Innovation, 27
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 53, 56 (2008). The term “innovation” refers to “scientific
breakthroughs, important commercial inventions, product modifications and new production
techniques.” Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust, Innovation, and Intellectual Property: Address Before the Stanford Law School
Program on Antitrust and Intellectual Property (Oct. 7, 1994), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/0116.pdf. Mergers in rapidly developing industries may give companies the ability to
innovate and create new and more technologically advanced goods or services at a lower cost for
consumers. See infra Part IV.
27. Woan, supra note 26, at 55.
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competition and consumers. This is especially true in rapidly
changing industries like telecommunications and technology, which
may have stronger innovation and efficiency arguments supporting
their merger plans.28 In addition, if the FTC and the DOJ do not
approach mergers in the same manner and give enough weight to
factors such as innovation, efficiencies, and other economic concerns
like job creation, courts will have less to consider when applying
precedent to investigations that reach litigation. Finally, because
firms and consumers are not always rational actors29 when it comes
to the technology-based products that they use, the courts and the
agencies should incorporate behavioral economics30 into their
merger-enforcement analysis so they can better ascertain which
mergers are truly harmful to the economy. If the courts and agencies
fail to change the way they approach merger enforcement, they may
unnecessarily block beneficial horizontal mergers that do not pose a
great risk of creating a single firm with a dominant market share or a
concentrated market conducive to collusive activity.
In analyzing horizontal merger enforcement, it is important to
understand how this area of law has evolved and how sensitive it can
be to various economic considerations. Thus, Part II provides a
backdrop for this Article by tracing the development and
enforcement of antitrust law as it pertains to mergers. Part III then
analyzes how horizontal merger enforcement is being handled
generally and includes a discussion of how the Obama
Administration’s aggressive stance on merger enforcement is
appropriate given the harsh economic climate and why the agencies
and the courts still pose an obstacle to successful merger analysis.
Part IV focuses on what can be done to eliminate the disparity
between the agencies’ and the courts’ approaches to horizontal
mergers. Finally, Part V discusses the impact of horizontal merger
enforcement on rapidly changing markets, with a focus on what the
DOJ’s former case against AT&T and T-Mobile means for future
mergers in industries such as telecommunications and technology.
This part posits that, unlike transactions in traditional industries,
these kinds of mergers require greater attention to factors such as
28. See infra Part IV.C.
29. See infra Part IV.D.
30. Id.
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efficiency, innovation, and consumer benefits (including job
creation) that undoubtedly improve consumer welfare in the long
run; only then can the agencies and the courts make the proper
determination about whether a merger will be harmful to competition
and the market in general.
II. BACKGROUND
An understanding of what horizontal mergers are and how
corresponding policies have evolved is necessary to evaluate the
current state of horizontal merger enforcement in the United States.
The following section provides an overview of the mechanics of
horizontal mergers, the statutes governing their implementation, the
government’s role in overseeing these mergers, and the current
administration’s actions regarding these proposed business deals.
A. The Basics
According to neoclassical economic theory, people are rational
actors seeking to maximize their profits in efficient and selfcorrecting markets.31 Thus, if an individual or a firm makes a bad
business decision while trying to increase profits, the market will
correct this lapse in judgment and eventually cause the actor to leave
the industry.32 One such way that an economic actor may decide to
maximize its profits is by agreeing to a horizontal merger with a
competitor.33 Government intervention in these kinds of deals is
usually unnecessary because the market can adjust to offset the
effects of faulty mergers,34 but there are certain circumstances where
federal agencies and courts may have to step in and regulate
companies engaged in horizontal mergers in order to protect
competition and consumers.

31. Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1548
n.136 (2011) (citing Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 928, 933–34 (1979)).
32. Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 266
(2010).
33. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65, 70 (2011).
34. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1548.
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1. How a Horizontal Merger Works
A transaction between two firms qualifies as a horizontal merger
“when one firm acquires another firm that manufacturers the same
product or a close substitute, and both firms operate in the same
geographic market.”35 In other words, the parties involved in a
horizontal merger are competitors in a single industry and region that
have decided to become one company.36
Horizontal mergers between competing firms can have many
important economic implications. First, a merger can result in fewer
firms in the market, thus increasing market concentration37 and
giving each firm involved in the transaction a greater market share.38
Horizontal mergers may also lead to harmful monopolistic activity or
collusion in the form of oligopolistic behavior39 on the part of the
companies involved in the transaction, which can lead to price
increases that may harm consumers.40 On the positive side, however,
horizontal mergers may increase a firm’s efficiency and allow it to
produce more goods at a cheaper price or invest more in research and
development.41 Because mergers can cause these effects—and many
more—Congress has enacted several pieces of antitrust legislation
that allow the FTC and the DOJ to determine whether they should
approve or challenge a proposed merger between competing firms.

35. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 542 (4th ed. 2011).
36. Id.
37. Market concentration refers to how many firms are in the market and how much of the
market each firm controls. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 18. This factor can help the
agencies determine whether a horizontal merger will have anticompetitive effects. Id.
38. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 544. Market share refers to how much of the market
a firm controls. Market Share Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/market+share (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
39. A firm engages in monopolistic behavior when it controls the market in terms of price,
and it participates in oligopolistic behavior when it colludes with other firms to collectively
control the market price. Economic Basics: Monopolies, Oligopolies and Perfect Competition,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/
economics6.asp#axzz1obtfCQ8O (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
40. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 544–45.
41. Id. at 545.
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2. Statutes Governing Horizontal Mergers
The first piece of legislation42 that attempted to regulate
horizontal mergers between competing companies was the Sherman
Act.43 Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act gave Congress the
opportunity to delineate violations of federal antitrust law.44
Specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is
declared to be illegal.”45 Therefore, courts may find that horizontal
mergers that seem to restrain trade by suppressing competition
violate this section.46
Complementing Section 1 of the Sherman Act is Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which governs the area of horizontal mergers.47
Congress passed Section 7 in 1914 to supplement the Sherman Act
and allow the government to preemptively attack mergers that were
likely to harm competition.48 Section 7 does not make mergers
automatically illegal; instead, it looks to whether the merger has a
reasonable probability of creating either a monopoly or a substantial
lessening of competition.49 Because this section only focuses on
probabilities, a court may enjoin a merger without first requiring
proof that a transaction has already created anticompetitive effects in

42. This Article focuses on federal enforcement of antitrust law as it pertains to mergers;
however, states and private parties can also sue to enjoin a merger that they believe is an illegal
restraint on competition. Id. at 648–52.
43. Sher, supra note 5, at 44–45.
44. Id. at 45.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
46. The issue of whether a merger promotes or suppresses competition falls within the scope
of the “rule of reason.” See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). The U.S. Supreme
Court has said the following on the subject:
Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement “in restraint of
trade,” this Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only
unreasonable restraints. As a consequence, most antitrust claims are analyzed under a
“rule of reason,” according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into
account a variety of factors . . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
48. Sher, supra note 5, at 47–48.
49. Id. at 60–61 (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597
(1957)).
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the market.50 Specifically, the current version of Section 7 states the
following:
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person . . . shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where . . . the effect of such
acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.51
In 1950, Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver amendments to
allow the government to be more aggressive with its investigation of
mergers and acquisitions.52 This is reflected in the quoted language
above since the amendments make Section 7 applicable to both stock
and asset acquisitions, whereas the original statute only applied to
stock acquisitions.53 Furthermore, while Section 7 originally allowed
the government to consider a merger’s anticompetitive effects only
on the parties involved with a transaction, the Celler-Kefauver
amendments permit the government to consider a merger’s
anticompetitive effects on third parties in the same market as the two
merging parties.54
In addition to Section 7, Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act specifically allows the FTC to investigate
mergers.55 This statute gives the FTC the power to regulate “unfair

50. Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile
Transaction, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 48 (2011) (quoting FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568, 577 (1967)).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
52. Sher, supra note 5, at 50–51.
53. ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 967–68 (6th ed. 2010). This change in
Section 7 was important because it closed a large loophole in the original statute. Id. To prevent
the government from stopping a merger under the original Section 7, a company would acquire
another company’s assets instead of its stock in completing the merger. Id. Therefore, the CellerKefauver amendments allowed the government to regulate the multiple ways in which companies
could accomplish a horizontal merger. See id.
54. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2011). It is also important to note that the FTC has specific authority to
enforce the Clayton Act. Appendix 1—Laws Enforced by the FTC, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/append1.shtm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). However, it
technically does not have the power to enforce the Sherman Act. An FTC Guide to the Antitrust
Laws, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/factsheets/antitrustlawsguide.pdf
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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methods of competition in or affecting commerce,” thus enabling the
agency to halt mergers that would be harmful to consumers.56
A final statute that regulates horizontal mergers is the HartScott-Rodino Act (“HSR Act”), which requires parties to obtain
merger approval from the FTC and the DOJ.57 The HSR Act’s
purpose is “to amend . . . Section 7 . . . by establishing premerger
notification and waiting requirements for corporations planning to
consummate very large mergers and acquisitions,” and its goal is “to
strengthen the enforcement of Section 7” by allowing the
government to investigate questionable mergers before they are
completed.58 This statute illustrates the importance of the FTC and
the DOJ in horizontal merger enforcement and allows the agencies to
begin a process that may ultimately lead them to challenge a
transaction in court.
B. Federal Enforcement:
The Interaction of Federal Agencies
and Courts in Analyzing Horizontal Mergers
Given the statutory process that Congress has laid out for
horizontal merger enforcement, the federal agencies and the courts
each play a large role in this area. In other words, because of the
premerger clearance procedures that the HSR Act requires, Section 7
enforcement has become more of an administrative task than a
judicial one.59 The FTC or the DOJ must first initiate merger
investigations under the HSR Act before they can challenge those
transactions in court.60 As a result, both the agencies and the courts
are influential in determining which horizontal mergers will be
consummated.

56. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a, 18a(b)(1)(A).
58. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, pt. 1 (1976).
59. See Raymond Z. Ling, Note, Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The Growing Divergence
Between the DOJ and the FTC in Merger Review After Whole Foods, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 935,
939–50 (2010).
60. Id.
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1. Agency Enforcement:
The FTC and the DOJ
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC are both charged
with the task of investigating mergers and deciding whether they
would cause substantial harm to competition and consumers.61 As a
result of this dual enforcement system,62 the HSR Act requires
parties to file a notice of their proposed merger with both agencies.63
This starts a thirty-day waiting period, during which the FTC and the
DOJ confer and decide between themselves which agency will
review the merger.64 Then, one of two things can happen: the
investigating agency can clear the merger, or it can issue a second
request to further examine the transaction during another thirty-day
waiting period.65 After the second waiting period ends, the
investigating agency can allow the parties to complete the merger or
it can challenge the merger in court.66
2. The Development and Use of
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
in the Agencies’ Work
In investigating mergers and deciding which cases to litigate, the
FTC and the DOJ have come up with Horizontal Merger Guidelines
to focus their analysis of potentially anticompetitive mergers.67 The
DOJ first issued these guidelines in 1968, and since then the agencies
have created three major versions of the guidelines with slight

61. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 129 (2007). The FTC and the DOJ receive their power to
enforce the antitrust laws from various sources. The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act allow the
DOJ to pursue civil actions against companies proposing harmful mergers, while the Sherman
Act also gives the DOJ the authority to pursue criminal cases for egregious violations—for
example, explicit cases of price fixing and other clear restrains on trade—of the antitrust laws.
See id. Aside from Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the FTC gets its antitrust enforcement authority
from Section 5 of the FTC Act, which allows it to pursue both actions in federal court as well as
administrative hearings against parties to a merger. Id.
62. Id.
63. Mergers: Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/premerger_notification.shtm (last visited Sept. 29,
2011).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 642; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 63.
67. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 1.
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modifications in between.68 While their content has changed
throughout the years, the guidelines’ unifying goal has been “to
prevent the enhancement of market power that might result from
mergers.”69 To understand how the agencies have determined
whether a merger harms competition, it is helpful to look at how the
guidelines have evolved.
a. Horizontal merger guidelines of the past: 1968 to 2006
In 1968, the DOJ issued the first set of merger guidelines.70
These guidelines were based on the idea that “horizontal mergers that
increase market concentration inherently are likely to lessen
competition.”71 Therefore, the 1968 Guidelines specified the
thresholds at which the DOJ would challenge mergers based on a
certain market concentration.72 Prior to the release of these
guidelines, courts used a four-firm (“CR4”) concentration measure,
which accounted for the market shares of the four largest firms in the
industry, to determine when a merger would be illegal.73 The
downside to the CR4 approach was that the “legal standard for
market concentration and increases in market concentration evolved
in such a way that small acquisitions in relatively unconcentrated
industries became illegal.”74 Thus, the 1968 Guidelines created
standards that prevented the unnecessary injunction of certain
mergers.
The next major update to the DOJ’s Horizontal Merger
Guidelines occurred in 1982.75 These guidelines specified a new
focus for merger enforcement: “[M]ergers should not be permitted to
create or enhance ‘market power’ or to facilitate its exercise.”76
Additionally, the 1982 Guidelines introduced two new tools for

68. Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 50 (2010).
69. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 543.
70. Id. at 702.
71. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 50–51.
72. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in
Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 782–83 (2006).
73. Id. at 782.
74. Id.
75. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 52.
76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, § I (1982), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf.
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analyzing mergers: the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT) for
defining the relevant product market and the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) for determining at what post-merger HHI level the
agencies would move to block a merger.77 As compared to the 1968
Merger Guidelines, the 1982 Merger Guidelines focused more on
competitive effects and less on market concentration.78 Two years
later, the DOJ made minor changes to the guidelines that addressed
issues such as efficiencies and market concentration, thus resulting in
the 1984 Merger Guidelines.79
In 1992, the DOJ and the FTC jointly released a major revision
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.80 This revision was especially
notable because it was the first time the FTC joined the DOJ in
formulating guidelines for merger analysis.81 The changes included
the introduction of the concept of “unilateral effects,”82 a greater
emphasis on market entry,83 and a shift in merger enforcement from
traditional industries that provided consumers with homogenous
products to industries that produced more differentiated products in
connection with the “information age.”84 These changes indicated
that the agencies were basing their decisions regarding which
mergers to challenge less on the grounds of “structural presumptions
based on market shares and concentration ratios” and more on issues
77. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 52. The HMT allows the agencies to determine if “groups of
products in candidate markets are sufficiently broad to constitute relevant antitrust markets.” 2010
GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.1.1. The HHI measures market concentration by taking the sum
of the squares of each firm’s market share; this helps the agencies determine whether a merger
will have anticompetitive effects. Id. § 5.3. There are three types of markets: unconcentrated
markets (HHI below 1500), moderately concentrated markets (HHI between 1500 and 2500), and
highly concentrated markets (HHI above 2500). Id. Markets with higher concentrations are more
likely to experience anticompetitive effects due to a merger. Id.
78. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 53.
79. Greene, supra note 72, at 786 & n.43.
80. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(1992, rev. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter
1992 GUIDELINES].
81. Id.
82. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 54. Unilateral effects are a type of anticompetitive effect
created when a merger negatively impacts competition even if the other firms do not change their
behavior. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 6.
83. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 54. “Market entry” refers to the ease with which a firm can
enter the market. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 9. The FTC and the DOJ currently look
at the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of entry into the market to determine whether a
merger will be harmful to competition. Id.; see infra note 201.
84. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 49. Shapiro uses “information age” to distinguish the modern
economy from the “industrial age” of the past. Id.
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involving “qualitative competitive effects analysis.”85 In 1997, the
agencies slightly revised the 1992 Guidelines with respect to their
approach concerning merger efficiencies.86 This demonstrated the
agencies’ belief that “mergers [could] promote competition by
enabling efficiencies, and that such efficiencies [could] be great
enough to reduce or reverse adverse competitive effects that [could]
arise in their absence.”87
Finally, in 2006, the FTC and the DOJ released a commentary
on the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.88 The purpose of this
2006 commentary was to “provide greater transparency” and expand
upon points made in the 1992 Merger Guidelines.89 The commentary
focused on market definition and concentration, adverse competitive
effects, market entry, and efficiencies to help those interested
understand what the agencies examined during a merger
investigation.90 It is also important to note that the FTC and the DOJ
made clear that this commentary, while made prior to the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, is still useful today in interpreting the
agencies’ approach to horizontal mergers.91
b. The current state of the agencies’ merger analysis:
The 2010 horizontal merger guidelines
On August 19, 2010, eighteen years after the last major overhaul
of the guidelines, the FTC and the DOJ issued the latest version of
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.92 The 2010 Guidelines build upon
the previous guidelines and commentary by incorporating factors
85. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 224 (2003).
“Qualitative competitive effects analysis” refers to the manner in which the agencies evaluate the
market characteristics of a particular industry to determine whether a merger will have a negative
impact on competition. Charles A. James, Overview of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 447, 452–53 (1993). Thus, instead of treating every merger in every market in
a similar fashion, the FTC and the DOJ engage in a fact-specific inquiry for each transaction they
investigate. See id.
86. 1992 GUIDELINES, supra note 80.
87. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 55.
88. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
215247.pdf.
89. Id. at v.
90. Id.
91. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 1 n.1.
92. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16.
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such as the HMT, entry barriers, and efficiencies.93 Additionally, the
2010 Guidelines improve the agencies’ treatment of market
definition and unilateral effects in order to bring the guidelines into
agreement with current enforcement practices.94 For example, the
new guidelines clarify that defining the relevant market does not
have to be the starting point of merger analysis.95 If there is sufficient
evidence that adverse competitive effects will result from a merger,
sometimes this will be more informative than the market definition
about the nature of such a transaction; consequently, market
definition does not have to be defined first.96 This change thus ties
into a prior addition to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines regarding
evidence of anticompetitive effects.97 This section suggests that even
without proof of market definition or market power—tools central to
traditional market analysis—the agencies will be more aggressive in
challenging mergers with potentially significant anticompetitive
effects.98 Because of these changes, the 2010 Guidelines reflect the
FTC and the DOJ’s goals of recognizing frequently used economic
tools and increasing transparency with regard to the agencies’ merger
analysis.99
The timing of these revisions demonstrates that the merger
guidelines do not necessarily change with each administration, but
rather that those in office certainly have the power to influence them.
For example, one of President Obama’s goals was to increase
antitrust enforcement,100 and the FTC and the DOJ acted
accordingly. Consistent with President Obama’s objective, the
agencies revised the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010 to
incorporate developments in antitrust and economics that took place
93. Christine A. Varney, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Evolution, Not
Revolution, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 651–652 (2011).
94. Id. at 652.
95. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.
96. Id. For example, evidence about potential price and output changes might be more useful
than market concentration in determining whether a merger will result in harmful unilateral
effects. Peter T. Barbur et al., Market Definition in Complex Internet Markets, 12 SEDONA CONF.
J. 285, 287 (2011).
97. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of
Justice Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/hmg.shtm.
98. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 2.
99. Varney, supra note 93, at 659.
100. Obama, supra note 8.
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since the release of the 1992 Guidelines.101 This clearly illustrates
that changes to the merger guidelines can reflect specific antitrust
policies that certain government actors want both the courts and the
firms planning mergers to consider.
3. The Courts’ Role in
Horizontal Merger Enforcement
Since the FTC and the DOJ have the authority to challenge
mergers in court, federal courts have played a considerable role in
horizontal merger enforcement. The U.S. Supreme Court has heard
some of these cases and created important precedent; however, the
Court has not addressed the merits of a Section 7 case in almost forty
years.102 For this reason, most of the current analysis of horizontal
mergers occurs in lower federal courts.103 It is important to look at
both older Supreme Court cases and more recent lower federal court
cases to understand the current state of horizontal merger
enforcement.
a. Older cases
The Supreme Court has heard several cases regarding mergers
and acquisitions over the years, but the most notable cases come
from the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, the aggressive Warren Court
almost always blocked the merger in question.104 One important case
from the Warren Court era is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,105 a
case in which the Court analyzed the merger of two shoe companies.
The Court found that the merger violated Section 7 because the
probable effects of the transaction would increase the new firm’s
market share in various areas and result in a substantial lessening of
competition.106 A year after Brown Shoe, the Court blocked the
merger of two banks in United States v. Philadelphia National

101. Varney, supra note 93, at 651.
102. Daniel R. Shulman, A New U.S. Administration and U.S. Antitrust Enforcement, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 7 (2009).
103. Id.
104. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 53, at 987.
105. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
106. Id. at 346.
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Bank107 and established the prima facie test for determining merger
liability:
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effects.108
Finally, in United States v. Von’s Grocery Co.,109 the Court
blocked the merger of two major retail grocery companies, focusing
on the importance of market definition in determining the harmful
effects of a merger on competition.110
However, the Supreme Court’s tendency to block mergers
changed in the 1970s with United States v. General Dynamics
Corporation.111 This case was a turning point because the Court
allowed the merger of two coal-mining corporations, finding that
even though the merger would increase the concentration of firms in
the market, it nevertheless would not threaten competition because
coal was a resource that could not be recreated. 112 Thus, while this
case had unique facts that influenced its outcome, General Dynamics
indicated that merger enforcement policy would be less aggressive
than it had been in the past.
b. More recent cases
Since General Dynamics, subsequent merger enforcement
decisions have unfolded in the lower federal courts. While there have
been numerous merger cases since the 1970s, the following cases
give a brief overview of how modern horizontal merger enforcement
case law has developed.
Starting in the late 1990s, several federal cases have shown how
modern courts have addressed the issue of merger enforcement. For

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

374 U.S. 321 (1963).
Id. at 363.
384 U.S. 270 (1966).
Id. at 272–74, 277–78.
415 U.S. 486 (1974).
Id. at 494–502.
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example, in FTC v. Staples, Inc.,113 the court granted a preliminary
injunction blocking the merger of Staples and Office Depot, two
major office-supply superstores, not only because each company
would have had a greater market share, but also because the merger
would have allowed the new firm to raise prices to an
anticompetitive level.114 However, in United States v. Oracle
Corp.,115 the court denied the request of the DOJ and ten state
attorneys general for a preliminary injunction blocking the OraclePeopleSoft merger because they failed to define a proper product and
geographic market.116 Finally, in FTC v. Whole Foods Market,
Inc.,117 the appellate court ruled that the district court should have
granted a preliminary injunction blocking the merger of Whole
Foods and Wild Oats, two organic-supermarket chains, because the
product market that the FTC had identified—premium and organic
supermarkets and not general supermarkets—was valid. These cases
reflect various federal courts’ approaches to merger enforcement,
which involve integrating certain portions of the FTC and the DOJ’s
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (e.g., the increased emphasis on
competitive effects) while still adhering to older precedent that first
requires the definition of the product and geographic markets.
The cases since 2009 continue this trend. For example, in cases
such as FTC v. ProMedica Health System, Inc.118 and FTC v. CCC
Holdings Inc.,119 the courts granted preliminary injunctions blocking
the mergers of hospitals in ProMedica and loss estimation and
valuation software companies in CCC Holdings Inc. because the
mergers would have resulted in greater market concentration of

113. 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
114. Id. at 1081–82.
115. 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
116. Id. at 1134, 1158. The DOJ and ten states lost this case on the ground of market
definition because the witness testimony they offered to define the market was largely based on
consumers’ personal preferences as to high-end automated business-data processing systems
instead of whether the products were “‘reasonabl[y] interchangeab[le]’ based upon ‘price, use,
and qualities.’” Id. at 1131. However, given the 2010 Guidelines’ assertion that market definition
does not have to be the starting point of the court’s analysis—rather, evidence of a merger’s
anticompetitive effects may be enough—it is possible that this case may have turned out
differently today because of the merger’s probable effects.
117. 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
118. No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011).
119. 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009).
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firms, increased prices, and other anticompetitive effects.120
Furthermore, in FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of America121 and Malaney
v. UAL Corp.,122 the courts denied motions for preliminary
injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to define the relevant
geographic markets for the mergers in these industries—clinical
laboratories and airlines—and failed to demonstrate that these
transactions would not substantially lessen competition.123 Finally, in
United States v. Verizon Communications, Inc.124 and United States
v. InBEV N.V./S.A.,125 courts permitted the mergers of wireless
telecommunications companies and of brewing companies,
respectively, as long as the merging companies divested some of
their assets to compensate for their transactions’ possible lessening
of competition.126 Thus, a careful reading of these cases shows that
federal courts have employed the use of the FTC and the DOJ’s
Horizontal Merger Guidelines—especially when defining
anticompetitive effects—but at the same time have, consistent with
precedent, required parties challenging a merger to first successfully
define a relevant product and geographic market. This has been true
regardless of the industry in question: healthcare, airlines,
telecommunications, and various consumer products.
C. The Obama Administration’s Approach
to Horizontal Merger Enforcement
Closely linked to how the FTC, the DOJ, and federal courts
engage in horizontal merger enforcement is the overall
characterization of how presidential administrations implement their
respective antitrust policies. This section illustrates how the Obama
Administration has been more aggressive than the Bush
Administration in policing horizontal mergers, which reflects the
current administration’s efforts to find a middle ground between lax
and excessive enforcement of the antitrust statutes. President Obama

120.
at 74.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

ProMedica Health Sys., 2011 WL 1219281, at *53; CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d
No. SACV 10-1873 AG (MLGX), 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011).
No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010).
Id. at *7; Lab. Corp. of Am., 2011 WL 3100372 at *7–9, *23.
607 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
No. 08-CV-1965 (JR), 2009 WL 2778025 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009).
Id. at *1; Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1, at 1–2.
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first revealed this approach as he was running for office. Specifically,
President Obama said that because the Bush Administration had the
“weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the
last half century,” he wanted to “reinvigorate antitrust enforcement”
by increasing merger-review activity in an effort to protect
consumers.127 Since contemporary enforcement strategies are (at
least in part) a reaction to prior policies, it is helpful to place the
Obama Administration’s antitrust activities in historical context.
1. The Pendulum Narrative of
Horizontal Merger Enforcement
According to several scholars, horizontal merger enforcement
can be described by likening the government’s interventionist merger
approach to a swinging pendulum.128 On one end of the pendulum’s
swing, the government has been too aggressive in challenging and
preventing mergers, while on the other end the government has been
too lax.129 These scholars note that there have been four distinct
periods of pendular swings, each with differing intensities of
intervention.130
The first three periods of the pendulum narrative capture efforts
dating from the Warren Court era in the 1960s to the Clinton
Administration in the 1990s.131 The first period, the 1960s to the
1970s, is characterized as being “too aggressive” in terms of
horizontal merger enforcement, especially since the Supreme Court
blocked most mergers.132 The period of the 1980s is portrayed as
being “too lenient,” with the Reagan Administration challenging
relatively fewer mergers.133 Finally, the period of the 1990s—
especially during the Clinton Administration—is seen as being “just
right” in regard to horizontal merger enforcement.134 For example,

127. Obama, supra note 8.
128. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 134; see also Jamie Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1724
(2010) (describing the Obama Administration’s “stricter scrutiny of deals” as a pendulum
“swing[ing] back towards more aggressive antitrust enforcement”).
129. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 134–35.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Id.; see supra Part II.B.3.a.
133. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 135.
134. Id. at 135–36.
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the “zealous”135 agencies under the Clinton Administration
challenged forty-six to fifty-one mergers a year between 1998 and
2000, which equates to a little over a 2 percent challenge rate each
year.136 Thus, these three periods describe the pendulum of merger
enforcements as swinging from one extreme to the other, finally
settling in the middle with the Clinton Administration’s horizontal
merger policy.
However, the pendulum narrative’s fourth period, which spans
from 2000 to 2008, shows that the pendulum again swung to the
lenient end of the spectrum with the Bush Administration’s antitrust
policies.137 In this “cooling down” period of merger enforcement,138
HSR premerger notification filings, second requests from the FTC
and the DOJ, and actual challenges leading to consent orders or
litigated cases declined.139 In contrast with the Clinton
Administration, the Bush Administration opposed fewer mergers,
bringing a low of four challenges in 2005 and a high of sixteen
challenges in 2006.140 Even though companies filed fewer mergers
during this time period because Congress increased the HSR
minimum for the value of reportable mergers from $15 million to
$50 million—which may account for the lower number of challenges
overall—the average of the merger challenges brought between 2002
and 2006 was still only 1 percent of the total amount of HSR
filings.141 Furthermore, the trend of fewer governmental challenges
to horizontal mergers was seen more clearly at the DOJ than at the
FTC.142 Several of the more recent cases where the court ultimately
allowed the merger to proceed, including Oracle143 and Whole
Foods,144 were also filed during this era.

135. Ilene Knable Gotts & Phillip A. Proger, M&A Antitrust 2000 Annual Update: Clinton
Administration’s Last Year Continued Zealous Enforcement Trend, M & A LAW., Feb. 2001, at
17.
136. James Langenfeld & Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of U.S. Fed. Antitrust Enforcement:
Learning from Past and Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 3–4 (2007).
137. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 136.
138. Shulman, supra note 102, at 5.
139. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 53, at 1075; Shulman, supra note 102, at 5.
140. Langenfeld & Shulman, supra note 136, at 3.
141. Id. at 4.
142. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 53, at 1075.
143. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
144. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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2. The Obama Administration’s
Place in the Pendulum Narrative
Given that the pendulum swung toward the lenient end of the
spectrum during the Bush Administration, the Obama
Administration’s statements about bolstering antitrust enforcement
make sense. In 2009, the FTC stated that its antitrust focus would be
on industries that directly impact consumers, such as healthcare,
energy, technology, chemicals, and consumer goods.145 Furthermore,
the FTC and the DOJ released new Horizontal Merger Guidelines in
2010 to give guidance to companies planning mergers.146 The FTC
and the DOJ also continued to adhere to their policy of heightened
merger enforcement by “applying increased scrutiny to mergers, both
those subject to the . . . [HSR reporting requirements] . . . as well as
non-reportable, consummated transactions.”147 Finally, in 2011, the
Obama Administration remained consistent in its aggressive
approach to antitrust enforcement by challenging more mergers than
the Bush Administration, including the $39 billion proposed—and
now defunct—merger of AT&T and T-Mobile mentioned at the
beginning of this Article.
The FTC and the DOJ merger statistics for the fiscal years
during the Obama Administration support the assertion that the
pendulum of horizontal merger enforcement is swinging toward the
middle again. In fiscal year 2009, companies pursuing mergers made
713 HSR premerger notification filings, while in fiscal year 2010
that number increased to 1,200148 and consequently affected the
number of proposed transactions that the FTC and the DOJ reviewed.
Also in 2010, the agencies issued second requests in a little less than
2 percent of the merger filings.149 Several proposed mergers
145. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Enforcement Priorities in the New
Administration: Remarks at the Global Competition Review’s 2009 Competition Law Review 3–
4
(Nov. 17,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/
091117enforceprioritiesremarks.pdf).
146. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16.
147. Bernard Nigro Jr. et al., U.S. Antitrust Outlook, MONDAQ BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), available
at 2011 WLNR 2072182.
148. Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Overview of 2010
Antitrust Enforcement: Remarks as Prepared for the 7th Annual Institute on Corp. Sec. and
Related Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions (Oct. 7, 2010) (transcript available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264301.htm).
149. Id.
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involving high profile companies were investigated, including
transactions between United and Continental Airlines, Blue Cross
and Physicians Health, Oracle and Sun Microsystems, and Microsoft
and Yahoo.150 In fiscal year 2011, the number of HSR filings
increased to 1,450, and the agencies issued second requests in 2
percent of these filings.151 This included challenges to the mergers of
AT&T and T-Mobile; H&R Block and TaxACT; George’s
Incorporated and Tyson Foods; and Sara Lee, Grupo Bimbo, and
BBU.152 The upward trend in these statistics demonstrates that as
compared to the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has
challenged more mergers—many of which were high profile deals—
per fiscal year. This data thus reflects the agencies’ current
aggressiveness when it comes to horizontal mergers.
Aside from these statistics, perhaps the most notable sign that
the Obama Administration is taking horizontal mergers seriously is
the agencies’ update to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In the
overview to the guidelines, the agencies have made clear that
“merger analysis does not consist of uniform application of a single
methodology” but is rather a “fact-specific process through which
the [a]gencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools . . . to evaluate
competitive concerns.”153 Therefore, the agencies have made their
approach to merger enforcement more transparent by laying out the
following areas that they can examine in investigating a transaction:
competitive effects, targeted customers and price discrimination
(which includes the HMT test), product and geographic market
definition, market participants, market shares, market concentration

150. Id.
151. Sharis A. Pozen, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Developments at the Antitrust
Division & the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines—One Year Later: Remarks as Prepared for
the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2011 Antitrust Fall Forum (Nov. 17, 2011) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/277488.pdf).
152. Id. Most recently, in November 2011, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled in favor of the DOJ in its case against H&R Block and TaxACT. United States v.
H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 92 (D.D.C. 2011). The merging parties could not rebut the
presumption that their deal would substantially lessen competition, and consequently the court
enjoined the merger. Id.
153. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 1. The agencies will examine facts particular to an
individual industry, such as the power each firm has in the market, the effect of recent mergers on
the market, the ease of entry or exit, changes in price, and customer reaction to the merger. Id.
§ 2. Sources of this evidence include “the merging parties, customers, other industry participants,
and industry observers.” Id. § 2.2.
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(which includes the HHI index), unilateral effects, coordinated
effects, powerful buyers, entry, efficiencies, failure and exiting
assets, mergers of competing buyers, and partial acquisitions.154
While the guidelines state that these areas of analysis are not
exhaustive when it comes to what the agencies can present in
litigation,155 the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines demonstrate that
the agencies are willing to be flexible and creative in determining
whether a merger will harm competition or be detrimental to
consumers.
The Obama Administration’s increased antitrust activity,
especially regarding horizontal mergers, has set the pendulum
swinging back towards a middle ground. While this reflects the
administration’s efforts to find a balance between blocking harmful
mergers and allowing beneficial ones, the question remains as to
whether this approach is appropriate, especially given that the
economy is still recovering from a recession. Even though this issue
is complex, it can be analyzed by examining the FTC and the DOJ’s
activity in combination with the manner in which federal courts have
ruled on merger cases.
III. ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL MERGER
ENFORCEMENT IN GENERAL
Given the current economic climate and the Obama
Administration’s horizontal merger enforcement policies, it appears
that the government is handling the subject well. However, there are
still flaws with the courts’ and agencies’ approaches to horizontal
merger enforcement. More specifically, the agencies are actively
using the updated 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, while the
courts are more likely to make their decisions in accordance with
precedent that follows older versions of the guidelines.156 Because of
this disparity, the agencies and the courts must both find a way to
reform their policies if they are to be effective in policing horizontal
merger transactions.

154. Id.
155. Id. at n.2.
156. See infra Part III.B.1.
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A. The Appropriateness of
the Obama Administration’s Approach
to Horizontal Merger Enforcement
Over the past three years, the Obama Administration has
increased merger enforcement, as evidenced by the policies of the
FTC and the DOJ. However, the following question remains: is this
approach beneficial for the U.S. economy given its current state?
This section will argue that given the economy’s struggles, the
Obama Administration’s more aggressive approach to horizontal
merger enforcement is appropriate because governmental oversight
is needed to ensure that consumers are protected and that competition
continues to stimulate economic activity.
1. Current State of the U.S. Economy
Since 2007, the U.S. economy can be described as anything but
strong.157 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research,
the “Great Recession” started in December 2007 and lasted until
June 2009.158 During this eighteen-month period, Americans lost 7.3
million jobs,159 the popping of the housing bubble affected
homeowners and depleted many of their assets, and consumer
spending decreased.160 Some commentators aptly described this
period as “an era of economic frustration, characterized by slower
growth and contentious competition for scarce resources.”161
Even though the National Bureau of Economic Research
declared that the recession ended in 2009, its effects have lingered.162
The economy has seen some hopeful signs: compared to 2009, the

157. Douglas A. McIntyre, 10 Signs the Double-Dip Recession Has Begun, MSNBC (Jul. 14,
2011, 1:53 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43946055/ns/business-us_business/t/signsdouble-dip-recession-has-begun/#.TqysQlY0L7s.
158. The Associated Press, Great Recession Ended in June 2009, Panel Says, CBS NEWS
(Sept. 21,
2010,
8:26
AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/20/business/
main6884342.shtml.
159. Id.
160. Christina D. Romer, Council of Economic Advisers, Treatment and Prevention: Ending
the Great Recession and Ensuring That It Doesn’t Happen Again: Remarks for the Council of
Economic Advisors (May 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/rss_viewer/treatment_prevention_recession.pdf).
161. Robert J. Samuelson, The Great Recession’s Aftermath, THE DAILY BEAST (Jan. 3,
2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/03/the-great-recession-saftermath.html.
162. See id.
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2011 unemployment rate has decreased slightly,163 and the nation’s
gross domestic product has grown in 2011 more than predicted.164
Despite these points, unfortunately, inflation has continued to rise,
the housing market has not yet recovered,165 and the federal budget
deficit has exceeded $1.1 trillion for the third year in a row.166
Making matters worse are both the continuing lack of jobs for
experienced workers and recent college graduates167 and the socalled ever-increasing gap between the richest 1 percent of the
population and the remaining 99 percent.168 For these reasons, some
have reported that the “double-dip,” or a second recession, has
started.169 Because of this perceived renewal of the economic crisis,
many consumers and companies, including merging parties, may
face even more obstacles as they try to continue or to enhance their
businesses.
2. Criticisms of the Obama Administration’s
Approach to Antitrust Enforcement
The FTC and the DOJ’s investigations have become
increasingly protracted and demanding, thus forcing merging parties
163. The Employment Situation—September 2011, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR (Oct. 7, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_
10072011.pdf.
164. Chris Isidore, GDP Forecast: Growing Faster, But Not for Long, CNN MONEY (Oct. 24,
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/24/news/economy/gdp_forecast/index.htm. Gross domestic
product (GDP) is seen by economists to be “the broadest measure of a country’s economic
activity.” Id.
165. McIntyre, supra note 157.
166. Martin Crutsinger, Federal Budget Deficit Tops $1 Trillion for Third Straight Year,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2011 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/10/
federal-budget-deficit_n_923528.html.
167. Chris Isidore, The Great Recession’s Lost Generation, CNN MONEY (May 17, 2011,
5:30
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/17/news/economy/recession_lost_generation/
index.htm; Francine Knowles, Lack of Jobs Leaves More Suburban, Middle Class Sliding into
Poverty, CHICAGO-SUN TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:08 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/8305452417/lack-of-jobs-leaves-more-suburban-middle-class-sliding-into-poverty.html; .
168. Alan Bjerga, Protests Show Wall Street Will Be a Campaign Issue, Axlerod Says,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-16/occupywall-street-shows-u-s-wants-a-fair-shake-axelrod-says.html. This is a reference to the Occupy
Wall Street movement, which started in New York City and has become a worldwide protest
against the concentration of wealth in the top 1 percent of the population and the inability of the
government to provide relief to the middle and lower classes. See Jeffrey Sachs, Jeffrey Sachs
Speaks to Occupy Wall Street, CNN WORLD (Oct. 30, 2011, 8:00 AM),
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/30/jeffrey-sachs-speaks-to-occupy-wallstreet/?iref=allsearch.
169. McIntyre, supra note 157.
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to provide more evidence that proves their transaction will not be
harmful to competition.170 Given the state of the economy, this
practice could greatly discourage companies from planning mergers
if they believe that it is more difficult to successfully complete this
kind of transaction. For example, instead of wasting time and money
researching ways to complete a merger and defend against potential
lawsuits by the FTC and the DOJ, companies may use their resources
to work on other internal business projects. As a result, the FTC and
the DOJ’s policies may stymie many beneficial mergers that could
further innovation or foster industry growth.171
Another argument against the Obama Administration’s
aggressive horizontal merger enforcement strategy is that it may be
hurting the economy even more by halting job creation. For example,
Obama has been called a “job killer in chief” because his antitrust
policies are seen as detrimental to American businesses’ survival
chances in a competitive market.172 Many labor unions supported the
proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger because AT&T was at the time
the only unionized company in the wireless telecommunications
industry,173 but the Obama Administration’s “legal activism” in
challenging the deal may have eliminated not only these unionized
jobs174 but also potential jobs that could have resulted from other
transactions.175

170. Nigro Jr. et al., supra note 147.
171. Mandel, supra note 10.
172. Schiff, supra note 10.
173. Mike Hall, AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Would Be Major Gain for Workers’ Rights, AFLCIO NOW BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://blog.aflcio.org/2011/06/24/attt-mobile-merger-would-bemajor-gain-for-workers-rights/; see also Nathan Newman, Pro-Labor Progressives Should
Support the AT&T-T-Mobile Merger, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2011, 6:40 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/prolabor-progressives-sho_b_883321.html
(describing the benefits the merger will have on unionized jobs and noting that the
Communication Workers of America is one of the unions that supports the transaction); Sasha
Segan, Why Do So Many Groups Support the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger?, PCMAG (June 1, 2011,
4:35 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386277,00.asp#fbid=0udcVgtWoFR (noting
that many unions both in the United States and worldwide are advocating for the merger).
174. Maria Elena Durazo, Defending Merger Between AT&T and T-Mobile, DAILY NEWS
L.A. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/ci_19108319.
175. Schiff, supra note 10.
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3. Why This Aggressive Approach
Is the Right Strategy
Despite these valid points, the very fact that the U.S. economy is
struggling requires an aggressive antitrust approach from the
government concerning horizontal mergers. Admittedly, successful
mergers can help companies innovate, become more efficient,
expand, and create jobs for American workers.176 During the current
economic hardship, all these goals can help promote consumer
welfare. Businesses may also have more reason to use the “failing
firm” defense against FTC and DOJ challenges in order to argue that
their mergers should be allowed to proceed; otherwise their
companies would have to exit the market, causing more harm than
good for competition.177 However, despite the beneficial reasons to
allow mergers, aggressive horizontal merger oversight is still needed
to ensure that competition is not hindered by harmful transactions.178
If the agencies protect competition, companies will be more
productive and more apt to stimulate the economy.
History indicates that government oversight has helped
floundering economies. Before the Antitrust Division increased its
policing of antitrust activities in the 1930s after the start of the Great
Depression, competition remained unregulated and produced harmful
effects such as a lower level of firm output, higher commodity
prices, and less consumer purchasing power.179 Toward the end of
the Great Depression, the U.S. government revived its antitrust
enforcement policies.180 From 1937 to 1943, the DOJ’s Antitrust
Division began a “strengthened competition policy,” which included
increasing the number of its antitrust case filings.181 This protection
of competition played a part in the country’s financial recovery in the
1940s.182 Drawing from this example, former Assistant Attorney
General Christine Varney argued that “vigorous antitrust

176. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10; infra Part IV.C.
177. Phillip A. Proger et al., An Early Look into Merger Review in the Obama Administration,
M & A LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 16, 18.
178. Id.
179. Varney, supra note 9, at 3.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 4.
182. Proger et al., supra note 177, at 18.
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enforcement” is necessary and can turn the economy around.183
Specifically, Varney said that there are two lessons to be learned
from the Great Depression: “First, there is no adequate substitute for
a competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress.
Second, vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role
in the [g]overnment’s response to economic crises to ensure that
markets remain competitive.”184 Because many commentators have
likened the most recent recession to the Great Depression, 185 this
aggressive approach to horizontal merger enforcement seems very
appropriate.
During the Bush Administration, merger enforcement was lax,
and the lack of competition regulation did not effectively help the
economy grow. Consumer welfare decreased rather than increased,
in part due to failing firms that harmed consumers as they
floundered.186 Companies did not police themselves, and the current
recession began.187 Based on these observations, the FTC and the
DOJ’s revamped competition policy on horizontal mergers seems to
be a good step forward. Because a laissez-faire approach did not
work, perhaps a more aggressive one will be better. In other words,
we need government oversight to prevent companies from making
the same mistakes that resulted in the recession. Increased antitrust
enforcement, at least in part, accomplishes that goal. Only time will
tell whether this renewed horizontal merger enforcement policy—in
combination with other government solutions to stimulate the
economy—will ultimately bring the United States out of a potential
double-dip recession, but as of now it seems to be the most
appropriate antitrust remedy.
B. Existing Issues with
Horizontal Merger Enforcement
While an aggressive horizontal merger policy appears to be the
best way to police potentially harmful mergers of competitors, there
183. Varney, supra note 9, at 4.
184. Id.
185. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aNivTjr852TI.
186. See Varney, supra note 9, at 4.
187. Id. at 4–5.
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is still a problem with the current state of horizontal merger
enforcement. Despite the commendable efforts of the Obama
Administration in shaping antitrust policy to help the economy
recover, there is a disparity in the ways that the agencies and the
federal courts address the topic of mergers. This inconsistency in
horizontal merger enforcement poses a challenge to companies
considering such transactions because the parties do not know how to
properly structure their horizontal mergers so as to avoid liability
under Section 7. The government, therefore, must resolve the
inconsistency between the agencies and the courts in order to achieve
its goal of handling merger challenges with greater transparency.188
1. The Agencies’ and Courts’
Differing Approaches to
Horizontal Merger Enforcement
A discrepancy exists between the agencies and the federal courts
when it comes to the subject of horizontal merger enforcement. On
one hand, the agencies have been actively employing the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.189 On the other, the courts seem to be
strictly following precedent when making their rulings.190 This
creates two issues: (1) the agencies’ work in preventing harmful
mergers may be undercut by the courts’ refusal to accept the
agencies’ approach to horizontal merger analysis; and (2) companies
planning mergers may be at a disadvantage because they may not
know what to expect if their transaction is ultimately challenged.
In challenging questionable mergers, the FTC and the DOJ have
consistently employed the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Recent
filings by the agencies prove this point. For example, the FTC’s
188. Varney, supra note 9, at 5.
189. See, e.g., Complaint at 14–16, United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 2011 WL 5438955
(D.D.C. May 23, 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00984) [hereinafter Complaint, United States v. H&R
Block]; Complaint at 3–11, Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 9345 (F.T.C. Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter
Complaint, Lab. Corp. of Am.]; Complaint at 10–17, Phoebe Putney Health Sys., No. 9348
(F.T.C. Apr. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, Phoebe Putney Health]; Complaint at 4–10,
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 9346 (F.T.C. Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, ProMedica
Health Sys.]; Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 17.
190. See, e.g., City of New York v. Grp. Health Inc., 649 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2011);
Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010);
FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015
(D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011); Golden Gate Pharmacy Servs.,
Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-09-3854 MMC, 2010 WL 1541257 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010).
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filings to stop the mergers of clinical laboratories191 and hospitals192
make it clear that the agency implements factors from the new
guidelines and not from an older version. Additionally, the DOJ’s
recent filings against companies such as H&R Block,193 AT&T, and
T-Mobile194 show that the DOJ actively uses factors from the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to support its arguments.
Despite this, the courts seem to be utilizing precedent when
making their rulings but do not seem to give much consideration to
the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines. While the guidelines state
that defining a relevant market is not necessarily the starting point of
the agencies’ analyses,195 federal courts have required parties
challenging mergers to first define a relevant product and geographic
market as part of their claim.196 Without this market definition,
courts have dismissed lawsuits against merging parties for failing to
state a legally cognizable claim.197 This suggests that the courts are
unwilling to fully accept the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines’
approach to determining what constitutes a harmful merger.
The disconnect between the agencies and the courts creates an
issue for both the agencies and the companies considering horizontal
mergers. For example, the FTC and the DOJ may challenge mergers
that are truly anticompetitive, but if they fail to state their case in a
way that comports with precedent, then federal courts will apparently
dismiss the matter without reaching the merits. As for parties
actually planning mergers, the agencies’ and courts’ varying analyses
are problematic because they provide little guidance to companies
deciding whether to participate in such deals. Specifically, it is
unclear whether companies should heed the new guidelines or follow
past court decisions that take a slightly different approach to merger
191. See, e.g., Complaint, Lab. Corp. of Am., supra note 189, at 3–11.
192. See, e.g., Complaint, Phoebe Putney Health, supra note 189, at 10–17; Complaint,
ProMedica Health Sys., supra note 189, at 4–10.
193. Complaint, United States v. H&R Block, supra note 189, at 14–16.
194. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 17.
195. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.
196. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
197. See, e.g., City of New York v. Grp. Health Inc., 649 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2011);
Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27,
2010); FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL
3810015, at *21 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011); Golden Gate
Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-09-3854 MMC, 2010 WL 1541257, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 16, 2010).
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analysis. Responding to an agency challenge in court is a real
possibility, especially for large companies planning merger
transactions.198 It is important for these parties to know what they
might face so they can plan accordingly and assess whether pursuing
a merger is in their best interest. Therefore, something must be done
to reconcile the agencies’ emphasis on the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and the federal courts’ insistence on using precedent
when analyzing horizontal merger cases.
2. A Possible Solution to
This Enforcement Problem
Even though it is possible for future administrations to change
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which would require further
adjustment to the way agencies and courts approach such
transactions, a consistent approach is needed now given the obvious
disparity between the agencies’ and the courts’ current modes of
analysis. Approaches to horizontal merger analysis will constantly
change due to developments in economics and the economy, but the
goal of determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a
substantial lessening of competition remains the same.199 Therefore,
the agencies and the courts must consider and adopt the best
analytical solutions possible that benefit both consumers as well as
companies planning mergers. Ultimately, the agencies and the courts
must agree on a single, flexible approach to merger enforcement if
they are to achieve their goals of fostering competition, protecting
consumers, and achieving transparency for companies planning
mergers.
IV. PROPOSALS THE AGENCIES SHOULD
CONSIDER TO REVAMP THEIR APPROACH
TO ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
In order to make the process of horizontal merger enforcement
more transparent for companies planning mergers, several solutions
should be implemented. This Article proposes four different ways to
198. See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7a of The Clayton Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,
349 (Jan. 25, 2011). The most recent HSR filing thresholds are in the millions, indicating that
mergers between large competitors are more likely than mergers between smaller competitors to
be investigated and challenged. See id.
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
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improve the current state of horizontal merger enforcement: (1) the
federal courts should be more amenable to using the 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines; (2) the FTC and the DOJ must approach
horizontal merger challenges in the same manner; (3) the FTC and
the DOJ should be more open to considering merging companies’
efficiency arguments; and (4) the agencies should incorporate
behavioral economics into their horizontal merger analyses to more
accurately understand why companies enter into mergers and how
their behavior may impact competition and consumers. As long as
the agencies and the courts come to an agreement regarding
horizontal merger enforcement, companies will have a better
understanding of what transactions will be acceptable. This, of
course, will help the government protect competition and promote
consumer welfare because companies will more likely pursue only
beneficial mergers.
A. Federal Courts Should Be More Open
to Using the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
as They Decide Section 7 Cases
Even though the Horizontal Merger Guidelines are not law,
courts should be more open to using the 2010 version as they decide
Section 7 cases. Since the Horizontal Merger Guidelines accurately
summarize the economic analytical tools that the agencies use in
determining whether a merger would be harmful to competition and
consumers,200 courts would be wise to adopt the guidelines to bring
their own decisions in line with modern antitrust analysis. This
would then allow the courts to create new precedent that both the
agencies and companies could rely on in ensuring the success of
beneficial mergers.
The main hurdle that courts face in incorporating the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines is the guidelines’ approach to market
definition. Case law has established market definition as a necessary
element of a Section 7 claim,201 but the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines do not require the FTC and the DOJ to always initially to

200. Varney, supra note 93, at 651.
201. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 3; see, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 324 (1962); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 593.
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define a relevant market.202 The FTC has made clear that “market
definition is an important part of the analysis, but not necessarily the
starting point and certainly not the end.”203 Rather, evidence of a
merger’s anticompetitive effects on a market may be enough to allow
the agencies to gain an injunction.204 This puts the current Horizontal
Merger Guidelines at odds with the manner in which courts have
decided merger cases in the past.
This tension is new, as federal courts have used older versions of
the guidelines in a “precedent-like manner” in other points of
horizontal merger analysis.205 For example, in United States v. Baker
Hughes Inc.,206 the court rejected the DOJ’s argument that the
defendant had the burden of proving that market entry for hydraulic
underground drilling rigs would be “quick and effective” after a
merger.207 After this decision, however, the FTC and the DOJ
adopted the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines that described entry
as “a defense to the extent it is shown to be ‘timely, likely, and
sufficient.’”208 Subsequently in FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc.,209 the
court used the “timely, likely, and sufficient” criteria210 of the 1992
202. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.
203. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Making the Grade? A Year at the FTC:
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at Fourth Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium,
Georgetown Law Center, 4 (Sept. 21, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
leibowitz/100921makingthegradespeech.pdf).
204. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4, at 7.
205. Greene, supra note 72, at 775.
206. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
207. Id. at 987.
208. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 2 (quoting 1992 GUIDELINES, supra note 80, § 3).
“Timely” in the 1992 Guidelines refers to “only those committed entry alternatives that can be
achieved within two years from initial planning to significant market impact.” 1992 GUIDELINES,
supra note 80, § 3.2, at 27. However, the new 2010 Guidelines do not have this two-year
requirement; instead, the FTC and the DOJ simply state that “[i]n order to deter the competitive
effects of concern, entry must be rapid enough to make unprofitable overall the actions causing
those [anticompetitive] effects and thus leading to entry.” 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 9.1,
at 29. This suggests that the Guidelines are more concerned with whether new firms can join the
relevant market in time to effectively counteract the potential negative effects of a horizontal
merger and less concerned with a specific time period that differentiates between very quick entry
and longer-term entry.
209. 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998).
210. The FTC and the DOJ have carried these criteria over into the 2010 iteration of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 9, at 28. The agencies have
said the following on the analysis of entry barriers when determining a merger’s potential effect
on competition:
A merger is not likely to enhance market power if entry into the market is so easy that
the merged firm and its remaining rivals in the market, either unilaterally or
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Merger Guidelines in determining that the defendant distributors’
argument that entry into the wholesale prescription drug market
would not be harmed by the merger and did not outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of the transaction.211 This shows that, despite
the precedent in Baker Hughes, the court in Cardinal Health
followed the agencies’ merger guidelines to direct its analysis.
Few decided cases refer to the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines,212 so the case law that companies may be relying on to
defend their proposed mergers most likely predates the FTC and the
DOJ’s most recent update. However, since courts have previously
been open to the FTC and the DOJ’s analysis in the guidelines,213
parties may look to this precedent and believe that the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines can be successfully cited as persuasive
authority that supports their reasons for why their merger should be
allowed to proceed. Unlike with previous versions of the guidelines,
courts may be less willing to adopt the 2010 Guidelines because of
the significant conflict between precedent and the agencies’ current
view on market definition.214 This is most likely because the new
Horizontal Merger Guidelines are only persuasive authority, and the
precedent is grounded in the older language of Section 7.215
Regardless, federal courts should consider adopting the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ approach to horizontal merger
analysis. The goal of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to
“promote transparency” regarding what the FTC and the DOJ
consider when evaluating proposed mergers,216 and it is the agencies
that provide the courts with the information that ultimately

collectively, could not profitably raise price or otherwise reduce competition compared
to the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger. Entry is that easy if entry
would be timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character, and scope to deter or
counteract the competitive effects of concern.
Id.
211. FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 34, 55–58.
212. See, e.g., Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 27, 2010).
213. See, e.g., Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 55–63.
214. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 3.
215. Id.
216. Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Econs., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Update from the Antitrust Division: Remarks as Prepared for the American Bar
Association Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 18, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264295.pdf).
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determines whether a merger will be blocked by an injunction.
Instead of being mired in precedent that utilizes older methods of
horizontal merger analysis, the courts should use the 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines even though they “ask more of the courts than
previous versions have.”217
It is true that the guidelines can be changed at any time by any
administration, thus potentially causing much uncertainty and
confusion for courts and merging companies. Theoretically, the FTC
and the DOJ could change the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
multiple times during every presidential term, and the courts would
have to review them in order to keep abreast of the agencies’ modes
of merger analysis. However, frequent updates such as these are
unlikely to occur. Over the past forty years, the agencies have only
released four major versions of the guidelines—the original
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1968 and the significantly changed
updates in 1982, 1992, and 2010—with only two slight modifications
and a commentary for clarification in between.218 The fourteen-, ten-,
and eighteen-year gaps between each major update have given both
the courts and merging companies plenty of time to adjust to the new
merger guidelines and act accordingly. Furthermore, all of the
changes that the agencies have made have at heart the goals of
protecting competition and preventing any one firm from unfairly
dominating the market.219 These unifying themes have not been
thwarted by the introduction of new economic tools; rather, the new
methods of analysis utilized by the FTC and the DOJ are designed to
bring the agencies closer to achieving their goals with regard to
horizontal merger policies.220 By adopting the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines in their updated form either now or in the future, courts
will be able to prevent confusion and give better guidance to
businesses, especially since the new guidelines incorporate updated
economic analysis that is likely to be more accurate about whether a
merger is anticompetitive.

217.
218.
219.
220.

Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 4.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See id.
See Varney, supra note 93.
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B. Consistency Between the FTC and the DOJ
Is Necessary for the Success of Mergers
That Are Beneficial to Competition and Consumers
More than judicial reform is needed, however—the FTC and the
DOJ need to make procedural changes to the way they challenge
horizontal mergers and must come to a consensus regarding how
they initiate lawsuits against merging parties. Even though the
agencies use the same Horizontal Merger Guidelines to guide their
analysis, they have different processes by which they challenge
horizontal mergers, which can affect the outcome of their case.
Therefore, the success of a merger may depend largely on which
agency decides to conduct the investigation.221
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, the DOJ can bring civil actions against merging
parties.222 For “clear, intentional” violations of the law, the DOJ can
also file a criminal action against a party involved in an especially
egregious merger.223 When dealing with a merger that is potentially
harmful to competition, the DOJ seeks both a preliminary and
permanent injunction against the companies.224 The issue of
determining whether the horizontal merger should be blocked is
resolved in a single proceeding, thus giving finality to the merging
parties and allowing them to complete the merger absent a DOJ
appeal.225
On the other hand, Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the
authority to pursue actions against merging parties that threaten
competition both in federal court and in internal administrative
proceedings.226 When pursuing an action in federal court, the FTC
seeks only preliminary injunctions.227 If it loses in federal court, the
FTC can seek administrative relief and file a Part III proceeding

221. See DEBORAH A. GARZA ET AL., ANTITRUST
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 130–31 (2007).
222. Id. at 129; HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 643.
223. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 643.
224. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 130.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 129.
227. Id. at 130, 139.
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internally.228 As a result, this fails to give the merging parties a sense
of finality. Companies may move ahead with their proposed merger
after winning in federal court only to face an expensive and lengthy
FTC administrative challenge afterward.229
This procedural difference between the FTC and the DOJ was
made especially clear in the recent Whole Foods case. In this case,
the court “explicitly articulated a standard that significantly
reduce[d] the FTC’s burden of proof in its request for preliminary
injunctions.”230 This lower burden of proof was due to the fact that
the FTC seeks only preliminary injunctions, while the DOJ
simultaneously seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions in court
when challenging a merger.231 As a result, the DOJ has to establish
its case by a preponderance of the evidence, while the FTC uses a
lower standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction.232 Specifically,
the FTC has to meet a “public interest standard” mandated by
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which allows a federal court to grant a
preliminary injunction “[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the
equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate
success, such action would be in the public interest.”233
Review by either the FTC or the DOJ creates uncertainty and
causes additional harm to companies because it is unclear whether
merging parties will have to face more obstacles to their proposed
merger after winning the initial lawsuit.234 To reduce this
uncertainty, the FTC should follow the DOJ’s approach and file for
both a preliminary and a permanent injunction at the outset of
litigation.235 Knowing what they have to defend against will both
allow parties to better prepare for challenges to their merger and
instill a sense of finality after litigation in federal court is
complete.236 Furthermore, adopting this approach will make certain
228. Id. at 130. Specifically, a Part III proceeding is the administrative means by which the
FTC can seek a permanent injunction against a merger after failing to get a preliminary injunction
in court. Id.
229. Id. at 139.
230. Ling, supra note 59, at 936.
231. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 138.
232. Id. at 139.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
234. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 139.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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that the DOJ and the FTC are on the same page when it comes to
analyzing and challenging mergers.
By requiring both agencies to simultaneously file preliminary
and permanent injunctions in federal court, Congress will also ensure
that the FTC and the DOJ are subject to the same standard when they
seek to halt transactions.237 Since the FTC currently has a lower
burden of proof than the DOJ, the FTC does not have to offer as
much evidence to prove its case against an anticompetitive merger.
Especially after Whole Foods, arguably the issue is “no longer how
much the FTC must show in order to obtain a preliminary injunction,
but rather how little the FTC can show in order to obtain such an
injunction.”238 Thus, merging parties have more difficulty defending
their transaction against the FTC than they do against the DOJ.239 If
the agencies must file the same injunctions and are held to the same
standard in federal court, then it will be clearer what companies have
to prove and defend against to keep their proposed transaction viable.
Applying the same standard to both the FTC and the DOJ will
therefore allow the agencies to achieve their goal of transparency in
explaining the agencies’ horizontal merger enforcement activity.
Finally, the FTC should eliminate its internal administrative
proceeding process.240 To achieve this, Congress must amend
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to prevent the agency from pursuing
administrative action after attempting to obtain an injunction in
federal court.241 By allowing the FTC to only file cases in court,
Congress would save companies from uncertainty and the risk of
protracted litigation against their proposed mergers. While the FTC
may argue that administrative proceedings are needed as a backup in
case courts allow anticompetitive mergers, the costs of both time and
money for a second challenge can be draining on all parties
involved.242 This statutory change provides another option that
allows for finality and agency transparency, which will make
horizontal merger enforcement a more unified and efficient system.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Ling, supra note 59, at 961.
See id. at 958.
GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 140.
Ling, supra note 59, at 970.
GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 141.
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C. The FTC and the DOJ Need to
Be More Open to Efficiency and
Efficiency-Related Arguments
In addition to establishing a unified approach toward merger
enforcement, the FTC and the DOJ should also be more open to
looking at factors such as efficiencies, innovation, and the potential
impact on the job market when deciding to allow or challenge
mergers.243 The agencies state that efficiency factors are important to
their analyses of horizontal mergers, but in practice they often give
little weight to these arguments.244 Admittedly, the FTC and the DOJ
have had little time to clearly establish how they will use the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines with regard to efficiency and
efficiency-related arguments in practice, but because the number of
litigated horizontal merger cases is so few already, “it is critical to
understand how the agencies internally analyze efficiencies”245 and
to determine whether the current approach is best for competition
and consumers.
In the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the agencies state
that mergers may be beneficial because they can “generate
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability
and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices,
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”246 These
efficiencies can result from companies investing in research and
development (R&D) to innovate their products and services,
especially in technology-driven industries.247 However, for an
efficiency argument to succeed, the merging parties must prove that

243. Specifically, the term “efficiencies” refers to the cost savings that result from the
consolidation of competing companies. Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 49 (2007). Since these internal cost savings can free resources
and allow companies to spend more time on areas such as product development and workforce
expansion, innovation and job creation can be seen as important efficiency-related factors that
also promote consumer welfare. Efficiencies must be “merger-specific,” meaning that they must
be unattainable via another option that does not pose the same kind of anticompetitive concerns as
the proposed merger. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 30.
244. Woan, supra note 26, at 55; see Moffitt, supra note 128, at 1698.
245. D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the
Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 50 (2011).
246. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 29.
247. See Katz, supra note 243, at 12.
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the effect can only be achieved through the merger.248 The FTC and
the DOJ will apply a “sliding scale approach” to evaluate efficiencies
and determine whether they are enough to outweigh the potential
harm of the proposed transaction:
In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with
the magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive
effect of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable
efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to
customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will
not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market.
When the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger
is likely to be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great
cognizable efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the
merger from being anticompetitive.249
This statement indicates that efficiencies can be important
counterarguments to objections to the proposed merger, thus giving
merging parties a fair chance to defend their transaction.250
Unfortunately, the agencies have not given as much
consideration to efficiency arguments—especially those touting
innovation as an important outcome of a proposed merger—as they
have to other factors.251 For example, a study focusing on the fortyseven merger cases involving innovation arguments decided between
1995 and 1999 under the 1992 version of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines demonstrates that innovation was not necessary to most
of the courts’ decisions to either grant or deny an injunction.252 In
fact, factors such as increased prices and entry barriers appear to

248. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 30. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
specifically state that “[t]he Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with
the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed
merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These are termed mergerspecific efficiencies.” Id. Furthermore, the proposed efficiencies must be verifiable and
quantifiable. Id.
249. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 31.
250. See Moffitt, supra note 128, at 1709; Woan, supra note 26, at 55.
251. Woan, supra note 26, at 66.
252. RICHARD J. GILBERT & WILLARD K. TOM, IS INNOVATION KING AT THE ANTITRUST
AGENCIES?: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES FIVE YEARS LATER 2, 7–10 (2001),
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4mf5t2bm#.
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have been more important in thirty-nine of these challenges.253
Instead of looking at innovation, it seems the FTC and the DOJ have
put more emphasis on “(1) price effects, (2) quality, [and] (3) . . .
availability of the goods and services” that the proposed merger can
provide.254 If the FTC and the DOJ focus on these factors instead of
on other efficiency arguments, then there will be nothing to consider
in the agencies’ sliding-scale analysis that would counteract the
supposed anticompetitive nature of the proposed merger.
Increased employment for American workers should also be
seen as an efficiency-related outcome and, consequently, should be
given more weight in the FTC and the DOJ’s initial determination of
whether to challenge a proposed horizontal merger. Job creation is
especially important since employment is a pressing concern in this
economy. Given that the unemployment rate is still around 8
percent,255 job creation is a legitimate efficiency argument that
directly impacts consumer welfare: having more workers would
allow companies to innovate more quickly and create products for
public consumption more cost efficiently. This increased workforce
and creation of improved products would then spur competition
because other companies in the same industry would have to adapt in
order to remain successful. If the FTC and the DOJ fail to
appropriately consider these employment consequences, they may
ignore an important benefit that could be great enough to outweigh
the proposed merger’s anticompetitive effects.
Efficiency arguments, especially those involving innovation and
job creation, are important to consider in this economic climate. If
companies have legitimate arguments showing that their merger will
result in more choices and better products for consumers, as well as
more jobs for the public, then these factors should be appropriately
incorporated into the FTC and the DOJ’s sliding-scale analysis of
efficiencies versus anticompetitive effects. If the agencies fail to do
so, then mergers that may be beneficial to consumer welfare may be
unnecessarily blocked, which would cause more harm than good to
the economy overall.
253. Id. at 7–10.
254. Woan, supra note 26, at 66.
255. Motoko Rich, Job Gains Reflect Hope a Recovery Is Blooming, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2012, at B1.
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D. The Agencies Should Incorporate
Behavioral Economics into Their
Analyses of Horizontal Mergers
Behavioral economics—an interdisciplinary economic theory
that incorporates elements from fields such as neuroscience,
psychology, and sociology in order to determine human behavior in
the market256—is not a tool currently incorporated in the Horizontal
Merger Guideline analysis, but it is something that the agencies
should seriously consider when determining whether a merger is
harmful enough to be blocked.257 While FTC Commissioner J.
Thomas Rosch has stated that the FTC would consider “how to
incorporate behavioral economics principles into [its] enforcement
decisions,”258 this has yet to be seen in the government’s antitrust
practices. If the government is to promote competition and protect
consumers, it must utilize all available economic means of
examining how firms act and how their choices may impact others in
the marketplace.
Behavioral economics is different from the traditional Chicago
School view of economic theory that underlies the agencies’
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.259 The Chicago School assumes that
firms in the market are perfectly “rational profit maximizers,” which
enables economists and policy makers to predict how these firms will
act in any given situation.260 This theory is the basis for the agencies’
assumption that firms are rational actors seeking to maximize their
profits when planning mergers.261 However, behavioral economics
runs counter to the Chicago School’s view of economic actors
because it assumes that firms do not always act rationally or
predictably.262 Instead, it assumes that actors behave according to
their “bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-

256. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1532.
257. See id. at 1531.
258. Rosch, supra note 145, at 23.
259. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1552.
260. Id. at 1548 (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928, 933–34 (1979)).
261. Id. at 1532; see also 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 1, at 2 (“In evaluating how a
merger will likely change a firm's behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how the merger
affects conduct that would be most profitable for the firm.”).
262. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1532.
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interest.”263 Specifically, behavioral economics suggests that
economic actors (1) act rationally but are biased toward their goals
and beliefs (bounded rationality); (2) sometimes behave in a manner
that is harmful to their long-term interests because of the short-term
benefits (bounded willpower); and (3) may be motivated by the
desire to benefit others rather than to maximize wealth (bounded
self-interest).264
Given the weakened state of the economy, behavioral economics
offers several benefits. Firms do not always act as perfectly rational
actors, and behavioral economics can be used to account for that fact
in horizontal merger analysis. People often make decisions and plan
mergers in a way that runs contrary to the assumptions of traditional
economics; for example, chief executive officers in particular have
been “both overly confident in their abilities and more risk-seeking
than a rational choice model would predict.”265 This explains why
companies may act in an economically irrational manner when they
overestimate the efficiencies of their planned mergers.266 For
example, the AOL/Time-Warner and Sony/Columbia Pictures
mergers did not result in the efficiencies that the merging parties
believed would occur.267 These deals were allowed under a
traditional antitrust analysis, but the use of behavioral economics
may have helped the agencies better analyze the merging companies’
biases and evaluate whether the deals would actually result in
efficiencies that would benefit consumers.268 Furthermore, the
Chicago School posits that the rationality of firms allows markets to
self-correct and operate efficiently, but the recent recession that the
United States has experienced proves that firms can act irrationally
and actually make the market and consumers worse off than
before.269 Therefore, the Chicago School assumptions that drive
traditional merger analysis are not always valid.270 The effect that
economically irrational firms have on consumers needs to be taken

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id. at 1533–38.
Langevoort, supra note 33, at 71.
Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1561–62.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1531, 1539–41.
Id. at 1532.
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into consideration when determining how a merger will impact
competition and consumer welfare.271
Since behavioral economics has developed as a way to deal with
irrational actors, this theory can supplement the agencies’ current
approach to analyzing the behavior of merging parties.272 By looking
at mergers in terms of bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and
bounded self-interest, the FTC and the DOJ can more accurately
grasp why companies plan mergers. This allows the agencies to
account for any bias that merging parties may have, especially in
regard to two factors that the FTC and the DOJ have included in their
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: entry barriers and efficiencies.273 For
example, bias can influence what companies believe a merger can
accomplish in terms of efficiencies and whether firms enter into the
market after a proposed merger.274 The agencies and the merging
parties will undoubtedly include arguments regarding entry barriers
and efficiencies in any filing or argument that they present in court.
For instance, the agencies could use behavioral economics to argue,
both in their pleadings and with expert witnesses at trial, that a
merger that would pass traditional analysis—such as the AOL/TimeWarner or Sony/Columbia Pictures mergers—would harm
competition because the merging parties are biased in believing that
their deal will generate cost savings for consumers when it would
actually make it more difficult for other companies to enter the
market and provide the same or similar service or good. Based on
this information, courts can make more informed decisions when
ruling on whether a merger should be enjoined. Even though
behavioral economics is unlikely to inform a definitive rule that the
courts can employ when deciding horizontal merger cases, it can still
271. See id. at 1532–33.
272. See id. at 1553–54.
273. Id. at 1557–63.
274. Id. The three kinds of bias that can have an effect on entry barriers are “optimistic bias,”
“desirability bias” (also known as “wishful thinking”), and the bias that results when firms ignore
the current state of competition and focus on themselves instead. Id. at 1557–58. Because firms
may not fully understand how a merger may affect the market, behavioral economics would be
helpful in explaining the actions of companies evaluating whether to enter the market after such a
proposed transaction. See id. Regarding efficiencies, merging companies may demonstrate signs
of “self-attribution bias” and overestimate the beneficial aspects of their proposed transaction
based on their companies’ previous successes. Id. at 1562–63. Looking at this self-attribution bias
can help the agencies and the courts determine whether a merging party’s efficiency argument is
valid. Id.
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be beneficial to the FTC and the DOJ in making their prelitigation
determinations of whether a transaction will harm competition and
consumers more comprehensive.
Although the agencies should not completely displace the
economics they currently use in analyzing horizontal mergers, they
should integrate elements of behavioral economics so that their
analyses accurately reflect what can happen in the market. This
economic theory does upset the traditional Chicago School approach
by complicating the view of the market and market participants, and
it does not allow for an exacting test for whether a horizontal merger
will be beneficial, but it also expands the agencies’ and courts’ views
on what could hinder or help competition and consumers.275 Some
scholars have said that “the insights from behavioral economics
can . . . provid[e] agencies, courts, and legislatures with an additional
lens through which to understand the facts before them,”276 which is
what is needed to make horizontal merger analysis more accurate.
Behavioral economics takes into account what the Chicago School
does not, and these insights can make a difference in helping the
government and companies understand what kinds of mergers are
acceptable.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF HORIZONTAL
MERGER ENFORCEMENT REFORM
IN RAPIDLY CHANGING INDUSTRIES
The changes discussed in Part IV of this Article are especially
crucial for the successful handling of mergers in rapidly changing
industries such as telecommunications and technology. Since these
industries are dynamic, the agencies and the courts must pay
particular attention to how they approach Section 7 challenges in
these sectors. Even though the agencies say they apply the merger
guidelines in a fact-specific manner, they must also account for other
factors, such as arguments for efficiencies and innovation, job
creation, and failing firms.277 If they do not, mergers that benefit
275. See id. at 1577.
276. Id. at 1544.
277. For some larger companies, the agencies and the courts have an additional factor to
consider: the effect that foreign activity has on domestic competition. Some technology
companies such as Microsoft, Google, and Intel are multinational corporations with competitors
across the globe. See generally World’s Best Multinational Workplaces, GREAT PLACE TO WORK,
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consumers and help the economy in the long run may unnecessarily
be blocked.
A. Rapidly Changing Industries
Such As Telecommunications
and Technology Are Unique
Because of the particular characteristics of technology-based
industries, mergers of competitors in these industries require special
consideration. Technology-based industries are dynamic because
they constantly benefit from technological advances, which makes it
more difficult to predict the effects a merger will have on
competition.278 As a result, the application of traditional horizontal
merger analysis may not achieve antitrust policy’s goals of fostering
competition and ensuring consumer welfare.
According to one scholar, one of the three typical features of
these industries that complicates horizontal merger analysis is the
prevalence of R&D.279 Because of the R&D that goes into product
development and production, these industries “undergo rapid rates of
technological change, much more so than traditional markets,” which
complicates the forecasting of industry growth.280 “The king-size[d]
firms of today [may] become the technological guppies of

http://www.greatplacetowork.com/best-companies/worlds-best-multinationals/list-of-the-25-bestfrom-2011 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing data for the top twenty-five multinational
workplaces in 2011). These companies’ overseas operations may serve as a check on their
domestic market power because they must use some of their resources to be successful abroad.
See, e.g., Douglas MacMillan, Google Undergoes Global Growing Pains, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/
feb2010/tc20100224_084405.htm (describing Google’s overseas business expansion as crucial
for the company since domestic growth in search advertising has slowed down). This lessened
power may cut in favor of allowing a horizontal merger because even if technology companies
have a large market share in the United States, they might not have the capacity to exert a strong
controlling force on the market. Along the same lines is the effect that foreign firms have on the
U.S. economy. Foreign firms may be able to check the market power of domestic firms by
providing alternatives to consumers, see, e.g., Ian Shapira, Begun, the Tablet Wars Have—and
There’s No End in Sight, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2011, at A09 (explaining the tablet and mobile
phone competition between Apple and Samsung, Apple’s South Korean competitor), which may
also mitigate the probable anticompetitive effects of domestic mergers. Both of these factors—the
activity of domestic corporations abroad and the impact of foreign companies on domestic
markets—can greatly impact how the courts and the agencies define the relevant geographic
market and evaluate a firm’s market power in some Section 7 cases.
278. Katz, supra note 243, at 2.
279. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4.
280. Woan, supra note 26, at 60–61.
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tomorrow” because of innovation,281 thus upsetting the traditional
notion that a firm’s ability to curb competition naturally results from
its high market concentration.282 This results in product markets that
are challenging to delineate in the terms of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, especially if the markets are volatile and of short
duration.283
Another trait of technology-based industries is that there are
initial high fixed costs and subsequent low variable costs related to
creating new products for consumers.284 High fixed costs refer to the
large sums of money companies have to invest before engaging in
any R&D.285 After these high fixed costs are incurred, companies
experience low variable costs because reproducing the good or
service is much cheaper than the initial investment.286 This differs
from what traditional markets experience because the development
and production of those products require low fixed costs and high
variable costs.287 Consequently, technology-based industries need
market power to set the price of their goods or services above what it
takes to produce one more unit of the good or service in order to
make the firm viable.288
Finally, technology-based industries involve “knowledge
spillovers”289 that “benefit[] . . . society at large, including the firms’
competitors.”290 This characteristic encourages firms to collaborate
and even merge in order to gain access to information that can help
them produce new and better products and services.291 These mergers
can be seen as antithetical to horizontal merger policy because they
have the potential to reduce the total number of firms in the industry
and thus reduce the overall level of competition.292 However, these
281. Id. at 61.
282. See CHARLES T.C. COMPTON, IP ISSUES IN THE ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF MERGERS 3
(2005), available at http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/Berkeley_Conf_PaperJune_05.pdf.
283. Woan, supra note 26, at 61–62.
284. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4.
285. Woan, supra note 26, at 62.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 63.
289. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4.
290. Woan, supra note 26, at 63; see also GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4 (explaining
that firms’ R&D efforts can produce knowledge that competitors may use).
291. Woan, supra note 26, at 63.
292. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4.
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horizontal mergers can improve consumer welfare by allowing
companies to make products at a lower price and enabling them to
pass on these savings to the public.293
Even though R&D, fixed and variable costs, and knowledge
spillovers in technology-based industries make horizontal merger
analysis more complicated, they do not make such an analysis
impossible.294 In fact, these characteristics require the FTC, the DOJ,
and the courts to be sensitive to the special challenges that
technology companies face when making the decision to merge with
a competitor.295 Therefore, R&D, costs, and knowledge spillovers
should be additional considerations that influence whether courts
perceive a horizontal merger as either anticompetitive or beneficial
to competition and consumers.
B. Case Study:
The AT&T and T-Mobile Merger
With these characteristics in mind, it is clear that both the
agencies and the federal courts should pay close attention to the facts
regarding horizontal mergers in rapidly changing industries. These
industries are markedly different from traditional ones and should
thus elicit a more nuanced antitrust analysis. While the DOJ’s
lawsuit against AT&T and T-Mobile is now moot because the parties
abandoned the merger, the transaction remains a prime example of
why special care should be taken with mergers in technology-driven
industries.
1. Description of Case
On March 20, 2011, AT&T and T-Mobile agreed to enter into a
$39 billion merger in which AT&T would acquire T-Mobile from its
parent company, Deutsche Telekom AG (“Deutsche Telekom”).296
Both AT&T and T-Mobile comprise two of the four major U.S.
wireless service providers, with the other two companies being
Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) and Sprint Nextel Corp. (“Sprint”).297

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Woan, supra note 26, at 63.
Id.
Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 2–5.
Id. at 2.
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Together, these companies comprise the “Big Four” and account for
90 percent of the mobile wireless service market.298
Because the AT&T/T-Mobile deal would collapse the Big Four
into a “Big Three,” the DOJ filed suit in federal court in August 2011
to enjoin the merger.299 Specifically, the DOJ argued in its complaint
that the AT&T/T-Mobile merger would violate Section 7 by harming
competition, thus resulting in “higher prices, less product variety and
innovation, and poorer quality services due to reduced incentives to
invest than would exist absent the merger.”300 In response to these
allegations, AT&T argued that the merger would allow the merged
company to “provide wireless broadband access to more people . . .
and . . . provide more competition in an already competitive
industry.”301 AT&T also utilized the failing firm defense302
mentioned in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, stating that if the
court did not approve the merger, T-Mobile would suffer from the
lack of investment from its parent company.303 Finally, AT&T and
its supporters argued that the merger would bring back five thousand
call-center jobs to the United States304 and create an additional
hundred thousand jobs,305 which would add more jobs to the “only
unionized wireless telecommunications company in the country.”306
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Roger Cheng, AT&T Responds to Justice Department Lawsuit, CNET (Sept. 9, 2011),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-20104072-94/at-t-responds-to-justice-department-lawsuit/.
302. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 11. The failing firm defense says that “a merger
is not likely to enhance market power if imminent failure . . . of one of the merging firms would
cause the assets of that firm to exit the relevant market.” Id. In order to successfully utilize the
failing firm defense, AT&T and T-Mobile must prove that
(1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the
near future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable
alternative offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant
market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger.
Id.
303. Cheng, supra note 301.
304. AT&T to Bring 5,000 Call Center Jobs Back to U.S. Following T-Mobile Merger
Closing, AT&T (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=20909&cdvn=
news&newsarticleid=32663.
305. Roger Cheng, U.S. Attorney General: DOJ “Ready and Eager” for AT&T Trial, CNET
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57320696-94/u.s-attorney-general-doj-readyand-eager-for-at-t-trial/.
306. Nathan Newman, Pro-Labor Progressives Should Support the AT&T-T-Mobile Merger,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/prolabor-
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Shortly after the DOJ filed for this injunction, seven state
attorneys general filed suit to halt the merger as well.307 Even though
the trial was scheduled to begin on February 13, 2012,308 AT&T
stated it was still “interested in a solution that addresse[d] the DOJ’s
issues with the T-Mobile merger.”309 Despite these efforts to make
the deal a reality, AT&T and T-Mobile ended their merger plans on
December 19, 2011, after acknowledging they “could not overcome
stiff opposition by the Obama Administration.”310
2. What Would Have Happened with
the Merger Given the Current State
of Horizontal Merger Enforcement
If AT&T and T-Mobile had gone through with their merger
plans and if the agencies and the courts had analyzed the deal in
accordance with precedent, the merger would most likely have been
blocked. Since the definition of a relevant product or geographic
market would not have been an issue, the court likely would have
resolved the failing firm defense and the factors of market share and
concentration, unilateral effects, entry barriers, and efficiencies in the
DOJ’s favor without much debate in court.
In arguing against the merger, the DOJ would have asserted that
the transaction between AT&T and T-Mobile would have increased
the new firm’s market share and reduced the number of major firms
in the wireless telecommunications market, thus posing a threat to
competition. This increased market share would most likely have
progressives-sho_b_883321.html; see also Maria Elena Durazo, Defending Merger Between
AT&T and T-Mobile, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/
ci_19108319 (highlighting an AFL-CIO member’s argument that unionizing T-Mobile workers as
a result of the merger with AT&T will give them “the right and opportunity to bargain for better
[working] conditions”); Sacha Segan, Why Do So Many Groups Support the AT&T/T-Mobile
Merger?,
PCMAG
(Jun. 1,
2011),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2386277,00.asp#fbid=hVu_JTdJkWu (describing how the merger would be beneficial to
T-Mobile’s non-unionized workers).
307. Cecilia Kang, AT&T, T-Mobile Merger Faces New Obstacle as Seven States Join DOJ
Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/posttech/atandt-t-mobile-merger-faces-new-obstacle-as-seven-states-join-doj-lawsuit/2011/09/16/
gIQAC3a2XK_blog.html.
308. Cheng, supra note 305.
309. Cheng, supra note 301.
310. Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-tmobile/.
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been evidence of the proposed firm’s enhanced market power in a
highly concentrated market. As a result, the merger would have been
blocked if the court accepted the DOJ’s argument that the transaction
would decrease competition since there would be three major cell
phone service providers instead of four, with the AT&T/T-Mobile
firm as the company controlling the market.
Because of this enhanced market power, the DOJ would have
also argued that the merger would have resulted in the unilateral
effects of higher prices and reduced variety of products. 311 This
argument might or might not have been valid, especially since the
wireless telecommunications industry is technology-based and
involves a high level of innovation and R&D.312 Therefore, even if
there would have been a merger, the new AT&T/T-Mobile firm
might have been forced to lower prices and provide more products to
keep up with the technological advances of Verizon and Sprint.
Without more facts, however, this would be difficult to prove.
The DOJ might have also argued that the AT&T and T-Mobile
merger would have made it more difficult for new firms to enter the
market. Because of the size and market power of the merged
company, smaller companies might have decided to opt out of
entering the wireless telecommunications industry because it would
have been an unprofitable venture. High entry barriers resulting from
the merger would have prevented new companies from entering the
national wireless telecommunications market and might possibly
have prevented them from entering the regional wireless
telecommunications market as well, even though AT&T and TMobile do not provide coverage in certain areas.
AT&T and T-Mobile’s strongest arguments against the DOJ’s
traditional horizontal merger analysis would have come in the form
of efficiencies and the failing firm defense. AT&T could have argued
that the merger would have resulted in more product innovation and
would have provided more jobs in an ailing economy.313 Another
defense that AT&T could have raised is that blocking the merger
would have put AT&T, T-Mobile, and their respective customers in a

311. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 21.
312. See supra Part IV.A.
313. Id.

1100

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1045

worse position.314 Specifically, AT&T was required to pay Deutsche
Telekom “$3 billion in cash and an additional $3 billion-worth of
wireless spectrum” if the proposed merger was not completed.315
AT&T could have also argued that this would not prevent Deutsche
Telekom from stopping its investment in T-Mobile,316 which could
be “potentially disastrous” for the smaller company.317 However,
given the courts’ sliding scale approach when it comes to efficiency
arguments,318 these innovation and job creation factors may not have
been enough to overcome the merger’s anticompetitive nature.
Additionally, it is unclear whether AT&T and T-Mobile would have
been able to satisfy the three factors necessary to successfully use the
failing firm defense.319
3. What This Failed Deal Means for
Future Technology Mergers and What Could Happen
if This Article’s Suggestions Are Adopted
If AT&T and T-Mobile had gone through with their merger
plans, the transaction would have most likely been prevented under a
traditional horizontal merger analysis. This Article’s proposed
changes would probably not have altered that result. This, however,
does not mean that it would be futile for the agencies and the courts
to adopt these proposals; rather, it shows that the AT&T and TMobile merger was doomed from the start. With any merger of two
large players in an industry with only four main competitors,
companies planning to unify their operations must be wary of
government resistance due to the threat that the transaction poses to
both competition and consumers. In this case, the AT&T/T-Mobile
merger would have given the new company 80 percent of the
wireless telecommunications market,320 and this extreme market
314. Id.; David Goldman, Without AT&T, T-Mobile Is a Wireless White Elephant, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 7, 2011, 10:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/technology/tmobile_
options/index.htm.
315. Goldman, supra note 314. This in fact is the penalty that AT&T faces now that the
merger is no longer a viable option.
316. Supra Part IV.A.
317. Goldman, supra note 314.
318. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10.
319. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 11, at 32.
320. Steven M. Davidoff, AT&T’s Battle for T-Mobile Is Political as Well as Legal, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2011, 6:58 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/atts-battle-for-tmobile-is-political-as-well-as-legal/.
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share would have put Verizon and Sprint at a large competitive
disadvantage.
While AT&T and T-Mobile would have lost under either the
traditional approach to horizontal merger enforcement or a more
nuanced approach, there is a benefit to adopting this Article’s
proposals: companies’ arguments for efficiencies, innovation, and
job creation would at least be given more weight. Given the current
recession, the impact that these factors have on competition and
consumers is important to consider. Cost savings could benefit
merging companies, which could then pass the savings onto
consumers via new and improved products created by potentially
larger and more efficient work forces. At any rate, adopting and
implementing these proposals could create precedent that companies
can rely on when planning and defending their transactions,
especially in dynamic industries such as technology and
telecommunications.
Mergers in technology industries would especially benefit from
this Article’s proposals in the area of efficiencies. Assuming that
AT&T and T-Mobile had continued defending their merger, the DOJ
could have seriously considered the companies’ efficiency arguments
regarding innovation and job creation in such a dynamic market as
wireless telecommunications. AT&T claimed that the merger would
have increased wireless broadband access to more people,321 which
could have been the result of R&D efforts to improve networks and
acquire better mobile phones for consumers. While the DOJ could
have said that these effects are not quantifiable enough to merit a
legitimate efficiency argument, AT&T and T-Mobile could have
asserted that they should have had a chance to prove that they could
have achieved these efficiencies because of the rapidly evolving
nature of technology-based industries.322 Together, AT&T and TMobile could have afforded the high fixed costs associated with
R&D and then passed the benefits of lower variable costs on to
consumers.323 AT&T and T-Mobile’s strongest argument would have
been that the merger could potentially create 105,000 unionized jobs,
which would help alleviate the pressure of the high unemployment
321. Cheng, supra note 301.
322. See supra Part V.A.
323. See supra Part IV.C.
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rate on the U.S. economy.324 The companies also could have stated
that because AT&T was the single unionized wireless
telecommunications company in the market,325 this merger would
have been the only way to create more jobs that would give workers
the ability to bargain for and achieve higher wages, better working
conditions, and more benefits.326 Because it seems that public
support for unions is weak despite these advantages to workers,327
AT&T and T-Mobile’s push for the creation of unionized jobs in the
wireless telecommunications market would have been even more
appealing. Therefore, these efficiency arguments would have been
essential to AT&T and T-Mobile’s case and could have been given
great weight when compared to the merger’s potential
anticompetitive effects.
Finally, application of behavioral economics may also help the
courts and the agencies predict how mergers like the one between
AT&T and T-Mobile may affect other companies and consumers. By
taking into account bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and
bounded self-interest,328 the courts and agencies would be able to
determine what biases are motivating the reactions of the merging
companies’ competitors and customers. In the AT&T/T-Mobile
example, Verizon and Sprint—the other half of the wireless
telecommunications Big Four—could have opposed the AT&T/TMobile merger for fear of harm to competition: prices would have
gone up as a result of the merger, which would benefit the
companies, but consumers may have remained with AT&T and TMobile anyway because of brand loyalty. Verizon and Sprint may
have also opposed the merger because they wanted to buy T-Mobile
themselves. It also would have been interesting to consider biases of
the consumers who would have been affected by the deal. For
example, these customers may have supported the merger because
they did not want to lose out on increased service in the form of
324. Supra Part IV.C.
325. Newman, supra note 306.
326. See Harry Bradford, Labor Unions, Advantages Understood, Still Near Record-Low
Approval, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/31/laborunions-becoming-inc_n_944094.html; Art Pulaski, Viewpoints: The Whole Nation Benefits When
Labor Unions Are Thriving, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.sacbee.com/
2011/09/05/3885139/the-whole-nation-benefits-when.html.
327. Bradford, supra note 326.
328. See supra Part IV.D.
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better cell phone reception and more choices in phones. Additionally,
there may have been an issue of brand loyalty because some phones
are only offered by certain carriers; regardless of potential changes
with AT&T and T-Mobile, customers may have stayed with Verizon
or Sprint. Finally, customers may have remained with Verizon or
Sprint because they were accustomed to those companies and their
current wireless plans. Therefore, these examples of consumer
irrationality could have impacted whether the AT&T/T-Mobile
merger would actually have affected competition in the wireless
telecommunications industry and could have been considered using
behavioral economics. While these specific arguments pertain to
telecommunications, companies planning mergers in other rapidly
evolving industries could use similar arguments. Because these
points focus on the behavior of customers and firms, behavioral
economics could give courts more to consider and provide a more
complete picture of both the positive and negative effects certain
mergers may have on the market.
If the agencies and the federal courts adopt this Article’s
proposals—especially those regarding efficiencies and behavioral
economics—and clearly lay out what they will consider in regard to
these economic tools, cases similar to the now-expired AT&T/TMobile merger effort would likely become helpful precedent for
other technology-based companies that plan horizontal mergers.
Even though this more nuanced approach to horizontal merger
enforcement would have been detrimental to AT&T and T-Mobile—
innovation, job creation, and behavioral economics arguments would
probably not have been enough to outweigh harm to competition in
the agencies’ sliding-scale analysis329—it may prove to be more
useful for other companies in rapidly developing industries in the
future.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Obama Administration’s more aggressive approach to
horizontal merger enforcement seems to be appropriate given the
weakened state of the U.S. economy, the system is far from perfect.
The FTC, the DOJ, and the federal courts have varied when it comes
329. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10.
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to their analytical approaches to the subject, and this is an issue that
must be resolved if the government is to achieve its goals of
protecting competition, promoting consumer welfare, and being
transparent in its horizontal merger enforcement policies. This
Article has suggested that (1) the courts should be more open to
using the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines; (2) the FTC and the
DOJ should streamline how they litigate merger cases and should
each be subject to the same burden of proof when trying to obtain an
injunction against potentially anticompetitive mergers; (3) the
agencies should be more open to efficiency arguments dealing with
innovation and job creation; and (4) both the agencies and the courts
should utilize principles from behavioral economics to more
accurately forecast how a horizontal merger will affect a given
market. These considerations are especially important for companies
in rapidly changing industries dependent on technology, such as
AT&T and T-Mobile, because market developments in those
industries are more difficult to predict. The adoption of such
considerations will lead to a more nuanced approach to horizontal
merger enforcement, which, although it may not have helped AT&T
and T-Mobile, may greatly assist both future merging parties and
consumers by ensuring that competition and consumer welfare are
protected.

